LPC 2015

# Using seccomp to limit the kernel attack surface

Michael Kerrisk, man7.org © 2015
man7.org Training and Consulting
http://man7.org/training/

19 August 2015
Seattle, Washington, USA

# Outline

# Outline

# Who am I?

- Maintainer of Linux man-pages (since 2004)
  - Documents kernel-user-space + C library APIs
    - ~1000 manual pages
    - http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
- API review, testing, and documentation
  - API design and design review
  - Lots of testing, lots of bug reports, a few kernel patches
- "Day job": programmer, trainer, writer

# Outline

# Goals

- History of seccomp
- Basics of seccomp operation
- Creating and installing BPF filters (AKA “seccomp2”)
  - Mostly: look at hand-coded BPF filter programs, to gain fundamental understanding of how seccomp works
  - Briefly note some productivity aids for coding BPF programs

# Introduction and history

- Mechanism to restrict system calls that a process may make
  - Reduces attack surface of kernel
  - A key component for building application sandboxes
- First version in Linux 2.6.12 (2005)
  - Filtering enabled via `/proc/PID/seccomp`
    - Writing "1" to file places process (irreversibly) in "strict" seccomp mode
  - Need `CONFIG_SECCOMP`

# Introduction and history

Initially, just one filtering mode ("strict")

- Only permitted system calls are *read()*, *write()*, *_exit()*, and *sigreturn()*
  - Note: *open()* not included (must open files before entering strict mode)
  - *sigreturn()* allows for signal handlers
- Other system calls ⇒ `SIGKILL`
- Designed to sandbox compute-bound programs that deal with untrusted byte code
  - Code perhaps exchanged via pre-created pipe or socket

# Introduction and history

Linux 2.6.23 (2007):

- `/proc/PID/seccomp` interface replaced by *prctl()* operations
- `prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, arg)` modifies caller's seccomp mode
  - `SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT`: limit syscalls as before
- `prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP)` returns seccomp mode:
  - 0 ⇒ process is not in seccomp mode
  - Otherwise?
  - `SIGKILL` (!)
    - *prctl()* is not a permitted system call in "strict" mode
    - Who says kernel developers don't have a sense of humor?

# Introduction and history

- Linux 3.5 (2012) adds "filter" mode (AKA "seccomp2")
  - `prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, ...)`
  - Can control which system calls are permitted,
    - Control based on system call number and argument values
  - Choice is controlled by user-defined filter–a BPF "program"
    - Berkeley Packet Filter (later)
  - Requires `CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER`
  - By now used in a range of tools
    - E.g., Chrome browser, OpenSSH, *vsftpd*, Firefox OS, Docker

# Introduction and history

- Linux 3.8 (2013):
  - The joke is getting old...
  - New `/proc/PID/status Seccomp` field exposes process seccomp mode (as a number)

```
0     // SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED
1     // SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT
2     // SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
```

  - Process can, without fear, read from this file to discover its own seccomp mode
    - But, must have previously obtained a file descriptor...

# Introduction and history

Linux 3.17 (2014):

- *seccomp()* system call added
  - (Rather than further multiplexing of *prctl()*)
- Provides superset of *prctl(2)* functionality
  - Can synchronize all threads to same filter tree
    - Useful, e.g., if some threads created by start-up code before application has a chance to install filter(s)

# Outline

# Seccomp filtering and BPF

- Seccomp filtering available since Linux 3.5
- Allows filtering based on system call number and argument (register) values
  - Pointers are **not** dereferenced
- Filters expressed using BPF (Berkeley Packet Filter) syntax
- Filters installed using *seccomp()* or *prctl()*
  1. Construct and install BPF filter
  2. *exec()* new program or invoke function inside dynamically loaded shared library (plug-in)
- Once installed, **every syscall triggers execution of filter**
  - Installed filters **can't** be removed
    - Filter == declaration that we don't trust subsequently executed code

man7.org

# BPF origins

- BPF originally devised (in 1992) for *tcpdump*
  - Monitoring tool to display packets passing over network
  - *http://www.tcpdump.org/papers/bpf-usenix93.pdf*
- Volume of network traffic is enormous ⇒ must filter for packets of interest
- BPF allows **in-kernel selection of packets**
  - Filtering based on fields in packet header
- Filtering in kernel more efficient than filtering in user space
  - Unwanted packet are **discarded early**
  - ⇒ Avoids passing **every** packet over kernel-user-space boundary

# BPF virtual machine

- BPF defines a **virtual machine** (VM) that can be implemented inside kernel
- VM characteristics:
  - **Simple instruction set**
    - Small set of instructions
    - All instructions are same size
    - Implementation is simple and fast
  - Only **branch-forward** instructions
    - Programs are directed acyclic graphs (DAGs)
  - Easy to verify validity/safety of programs
    - Program completion is guaranteed (DAGs)
    - Simple instruction set ⇒ can verify opcodes and arguments
    - Can detect dead code
    - Can verify that program completes via a "return" instruction
    - BPF filter programs are limited to 4096 instructions

# Generalizing BPF

- BPF originally designed to work with network packet headers
- Seccomp 2 developers realized BPF could be generalized to solve different problem: filtering of system calls
  - Same basic task: test-and-branch processing based on content of a small set of memory locations
- Further generalization ("extended BPF") is ongoing
  - Linux 3.18: adding filters to kernel tracepoints
  - Linux 3.19: adding filters to raw sockets
  - In progress (July 2015): filtering of *perf* events

# Outline

# Basic features of BPF virtual machine

- Accumulator register
- Data area (data to be operated on)
  - In seccomp context: data area describes system call
- Implicit program counter
  - (Recall: all instructions are same size)
- Instructions contained in structure of this form:

```
struct sock_filter {    /* Filter block */
    __u16 code;         /* Filter code (opcode)*/
    __u8  jt;           /* Jump true */
    __u8  jf;           /* Jump false */
    __u32 k;            /* Generic multiuse field */
};
```

  - See <linux/filter.h> and <linux/bpf_common.h>

man7.org

# BPF instruction set

Instruction set includes:

- Load instructions
- Store instructions
- Jump instructions
- Arithmetic/logic instructions
  - ADD, SUB, MUL, DIV, MOD, NEG
  - OR, AND, XOR, LSH, RSH
- Return instructions
  - Terminate filter processing
  - Report a status telling kernel what to do with syscall

# BPF jump instructions

- Conditional and unconditional jump instructions provided
- Conditional jump instructions consist of
  - **Opcode** specifying condition to be tested
  - **Value** to test against
  - **Two** jump targets
    - `jt`: target if condition is true
    - `jf`: target if condition is false
- Conditional jump instructions:
  - `JEQ`: jump if equal
  - `JGT`: jump if greater
  - `JGE`: jump if greater or equal
  - `JSET`: bit-wise AND + jump if nonzero result
  - `jf` target ⇒ no need for `JNE`, `JLT`, `JLE`, and `JCLEAR`

# BPF jump instructions

- Targets are expressed as relative offsets in instruction list
  - 0 == no jump (execute next instruction)
  - `jt` and `jf` are 8 bits ⇒ 255 maximum offset for conditional jumps
- Unconditional `JA` ("jump always") uses `k` as offset, allowing much larger jumps

# Seccomp BPF data area

- Seccomp provides data describing syscall to filter program
  - Buffer is **read-only**
- Format (expressed as C `struct`):

```
struct seccomp_data {
  int   nr;                    /* System call number */
  __u32 arch;                  /* AUDIT_ARCH_* value */
  __u64 instruction_pointer; /* CPU IP */
  __u64 args[6];               /* System call arguments */
};
```

# Seccomp BPF data area

```
struct seccomp_data {
  int   nr;                   /* System call number */
  __u32 arch;                 /* AUDIT_ARCH_* value */
  __u64 instruction_pointer; /* CPU IP */
  __u64 args[6];              /* System call arguments */
};
```

- *nr*: system call number (architecture-dependent)
- *arch*: identifies architecture
  - Constants defined in `<linux/audit.h>`
    - `AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64`, `AUDIT_ARCH_I386`, `AUDIT_ARCH_ARM`, etc.
- *instruction_pointer*: CPU instruction pointer
- *args*: system call arguments
  - System calls have maximum of six arguments
  - Number of elements used depends on system call

# Building BPF instructions

- Obviously, one can code BPF instructions numerically by hand
- But, header files define symbolic constants and convenience macros (`BPF_STMT()`, `BPF_JUMP()`) to ease the task

```
#define BPF_STMT(code, k) \
                { (unsigned short)(code), 0, 0, k }
#define BPF_JUMP(code, k, jt, jf) \
                { (unsigned short)(code), jt, jf, k }
```

- (Macros just plug values together to form structure)

# Building BPF instructions: examples

- Load architecture number into accumulator

```
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
         (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)))
```

- Opcode here is constructed by ORing three values together:
  - `BPF_LD`: load
  - `BPF_W`: operand size is a word
  - `BPF_ABS`: address mode specifying that source of load is data area (containing system call data)
  - See `<linux/bpf_common.h>` for definitions of opcode constants
- `offsetof()` generates offset of desired field in data area

# Building BPF instructions: examples

- Test value in accumulator

```
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K,
         AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, 1, 0)
```

  - BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ: jump with test on equality
  - BPF_K: value to test against is in generic multiuse field (k)
  - k contains value AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
  - jt value is 1, meaning skip one instruction if test is true
  - jf value is 0, meaning skip zero instructions if test is false
    - I.e., continue execution at following instruction

- Return value that causes kernel to kill process with SIGSYS

```
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL)
```

man7.org

# Checking the architecture

- Checking architecture value should be first step in any BPF program
- Architecture may support multiple system call conventions
  - E.g. x86 hardware supports x86-64 and i386
  - System call numbers may differ or overlap

# Filter return value

- Once a filter is installed, each system call is tested against filter
- Seccomp filter must return a value to kernel indicating whether system call is permitted
  - Otherwise `EINVAL` when attempting to install filter
- Return value is 32 bits, in two parts:
  - Most significant 16 bits (`SECCOMP_RET_ACTION` mask) specify an action to kernel
  - Least significant 16 bits (`SECCOMP_RET_DATA` mask) specify "data" for return value

# Filter return action

Filter return action component is one of

- SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW: system call is executed
- SECCOMP_RET_KILL: process is immediately terminated
  - Terminated *as though* process had been killed with SIGSYS
- SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO: return an error from system call
  - System call is not executed
  - Value in SECCOMP_RET_DATA is returned in *errno*
- SECCOMP_RET_TRACE: attempt to notify *ptrace()* tracer
  - Gives tracing process a chance to assume control
  - See *seccomp(2)*
- SECCOMP_RET_TRAP: process is sent SIGSYS signal
  - Can catch this signal; see *seccomp(2)* for more details

man7.org

# Outline

# Installing a BPF program

- A process installs a filter for itself using one of:
  - `seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flags, &fprog)`
    - Only since Linux 3.17
  - `prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &fprog)`
- *&fprog* is a pointer to a BPF program:

```
struct sock_fprog {
  unsigned short len;  /* Number of instructions */
  struct sock_filter *filter;
                       /* Pointer to program
                          (array of instructions) */
};
```

# Installing a BPF program

To install a filter, one of the following must be true:

- Caller is privileged (`CAP_SYS_ADMIN`)
- Caller has to set the `no_new_privs` process attribute:

```
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1);
```

  - Causes set-UID/set-GID bit / file capabilities to be ignored on subsequent *execve()* calls
    - Once set, `no_new_privs` can't be unset
  - Prevents possibility of attacker starting privileged program and manipulating it to misbehave using a seccomp filter

# Example: seccomp/seccomp_deny_open.c

```
 1 int main(int argc, char **argv) {
 2     prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
 3
 4     install_filter();
 5
 6     open("/tmp/a", O_RDONLY, 0666);
 7
 8     printf(" We shouldn't see this message\n");
 9     exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
10 }
```

Program installs a filter that prevents *open()* being called, and then calls *open()*

- Set `no_new_privs` bit
- Install seccomp filter
- Call *open()*

# Example: seccomp/seccomp_deny_open.c

```
1 static void install_filter(void) {
2   struct sock_filter filter[] = {
3     BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
4              (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch))),
5     BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K,
6              AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, 1, 0),
7     BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
8     ...
```

- Define and initialize array (of structs) containing BPF filter program
- Load architecture into accumulator
- Test if architecture value matches AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
  - True: jump forward one instruction (i.e., skip next instruction)
  - False: skip no instructions
- Kill process on architecture mismatch

# Example: seccomp/seccomp_deny_open.c

```
1     BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
2              (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))),
3
4     BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, __NR_open,
5              1, 0),
6     BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
7
8     BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL)
9   };
```

- Remainder of filter program
- Load system call number into accumulator
- Test if system call number matches `__NR_open`
  - True: advance one instruction ⇒ kill process
  - False: advance 0 instructions ⇒ allow system call

# Example: seccomp/seccomp_deny_open.c

```
1   struct sock_fprog prog = {
2       .len = (unsigned short) (sizeof(filter) /
3                                sizeof(filter[0])),
4       .filter = filter,
5   };
6
7   seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog);
8 }
```

- Construct argument for *seccomp()*
- Install filter

# Example: seccomp/seccomp_deny_open.c

Upon running the program, we see:

```
$ ./seccomp_deny_open
Bad system call    # Message printed by shell
$ echo $?          # Display exit status of last command
159
```

- "Bad system call" indicates process was killed by SIGSYS
- Exit status of 159 (== 128 + 31) also indicates termination as though killed by SIGSYS
  - Exit status of process killed by signal is 128 + *signum*
  - SIGSYS is signal number 31 on this architecture

# Example: seccomp/seccomp_control_open.c

- A more sophisticated example
- Filter based on *flags* argument of *open()*
  - O_CREAT specified ⇒ kill process
  - O_WRONLY or O_RDWR specified ⇒ cause *open()* to fail with ENOTSUP error

# Example: seccomp/seccomp_control_open.c

```
struct sock_filter filter[] = {
  BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
           (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch))),
  BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K,
           AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, 1, 0),
  BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),

  BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
            (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))),

  BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, __NR_open, 1, 0),
  BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
```

- Load architecture and test for expected value
- Load system call number
- Test if system call number is `__NR_open`
  - True: skip next instruction
  - False: skip 0 instructions ⇒ permit all other syscalls

# Example: seccomp/seccomp_control_open.c

```
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
         (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[1]))),

BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_K, O_CREAT, 0, 1),
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
```

- Load second argument of *open()* (*flags*)
- Test if `O_CREAT` bit is set in *flags*
  - True: skip 0 instructions ⇒ kill process
  - False: skip 1 instruction

# Example: seccomp/seccomp_control_open.c

```
  BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_K,
           O_WRONLY | O_RDWR, 0, 1),
  BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K,
           SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO |
               (ENOTSUP & SECCOMP_RET_DATA)),

  BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
};
```

- Test if O_WRONLY or O_RDWR are set in *flags*
  - True: cause *open()* to fail with ENOTSUP error in *errno*
  - False: allow *open()* to proceed

# Example: seccomp/seccomp_control_open.c

```
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
    install_filter();

    if (open("/tmp/a", O_RDONLY) == -1)
        perror("open1");
    if (open("/tmp/a", O_WRONLY) == -1)
        perror("open2");
    if (open("/tmp/a", O_RDWR) == -1)
        perror("open3");
    if (open("/tmp/a", O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0600) == -1)
        perror("open4");

    exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
```

- Test *open()* calls with various flags

# Example: seccomp/seccomp_control_open.c

```
$ ./seccomp_control_open
open2: Operation not supported
open3: Operation not supported
Bad system call
$ echo $?
159
```

- First *open()* succeeded
- Second and third *open()* calls failed
  - Kernel produced ENOTSUP error for call
- Fourth *open()* call caused process to be killed

# Outline

# Installing multiple filters

- If existing filters permit *prctl()* or *seccomp()*, further filters can be installed
- **All** filters are always executed, in **reverse order** of registration
- Each filter yields a return value
- Value returned to kernel is first seen action of highest priority (along with accompanying data)
  - `SECCOMP_RET_KILL` (highest priority)
  - `SECCOMP_RET_TRAP`
  - `SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO`
  - `SECCOMP_RET_TRACE`
  - `SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW` (lowest priority)

# *fork()* and *execve()* semantics

- If seccomp filters permit *fork()* or *clone()*, then child inherits parents filters
- If seccomp filters permit *execve()*, then filters are preserved across *execve()*

# Cost of filtering, construction of filters

- Installed BPF filter(s) are executed for every system call
  - $\Rightarrow$ there's a performance cost
- Example on x86-64:
  - Use our "deny open" seccomp filter
    - Requires 6 BPF instructions / permitted syscall
  - Call *getppid()* repeatedly (one of cheapest syscalls)
  - +25% execution time
    - (Looks relatively high because *getppid()* is a cheap syscall)
- Obviously, order of filtering rules can affect performance
- Construct filters so that most common cases yield shortest execution paths
- If handling many different system calls, binary chop techniques can give *O(logN)* performance

# Outline

# Applications

Possible applications:

- Building sandboxed environments
  - Whitelisting usually safer than blacklisting
    - Default treatment: block all system calls
    - Then allow only a limited set of syscall / argument combinations
  - Various examples mentioned earlier
- Failure-mode testing
  - Place application in environment where unusual / unexpected failures occur
  - Blacklist certain syscalls / argument combinations to generate failures

# Tools: *libseccomp*

- High-level API for kernel creating seccomp filters
  - *https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp*
  - Initial release: 2012
- Simplifies various aspects of building filters
  - Eliminates tedious/error-prone tasks such as changing branch instruction counts when instructions are inserted
  - Abstract architecture-dependent details out of filter creation
  - Can output generated code in binary (for seccomp filtering) or human-readable form ("pseudofilter code")
  - Don't have full control of generated code, but can give hints about which system calls to prioritize in generated code
- *http://lwn.net/Articles/494252/*
- Fully documented with man pages that contain examples (!)

# Other tools

- *bpfc* (BPF compiler)
  - Compiles assembler-like BPF programs to byte code
  - Part of *netsniff-ng* project (*http://netsniff-ng.org/*)
- LLVM has a BPF back end (merged Jan 2015)
  - Compiles subset of C to BPF
    - C dialect; does not provide: loops, global variables, FP numbers, vararg functions, passing structs as args...
    - Examples in kernel source: `samples/bpf/*_kern.c`
- In-kernel JIT (just-in-time) compiler
  - Compiles BPF binary to native machine code at load time
    - Execution speed up of 2x to 3x (or better, in some cases)
  - Disabled by default; enable by writing "1" to `/proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable`
  - See *bpf(2)* man page

# Resources

- Kernel source files:
  `Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt`,
  `Documentation/networking/filter.txt`
- *http://outflux.net/teach-seccomp/*
  - Shows handy trick for discovering which of an application's system calls don't pass filtering
- *seccomp(2)* man page
- "Seccomp sandboxes and memcached example"
  - blog.viraptor.info/post/seccomp-sandboxes-and-memcached-example-part-1
  - blog.viraptor.info/post/seccomp-sandboxes-and-memcached-example-part-2

# Thanks!

mtk@man7.org

Slides at http://man7.org/conf/

Linux/UNIX system programming training (and more)
http://man7.org/training/

The Linux Programming Interface, http://man7.org/tlpi/